代寫essay:反對麥克塔格特關於時間非現實性的主張
麥克塔格特舉了一個美麗的例子，考慮到女王的死亡，它有一些特征，如“這是一個死亡”，“這是女王的死亡”，“它有這樣的原因和影響”。事件在一個方面有一些變化，而在另一個方面沒有變化。變化發生在未來的事件，即死亡即將發生的時候。然後它變成了不久的將來，然後死亡發生在現在，然後它變成了不久的過去，然後遙遠的過去。因此，所有有情眾生的每一刻都在從遙遠的未來傳送到遙遠的過去，並不斷地穿越到遙遠的過去，進入遺忘，走出記憶。然後，麥克塔格特聲稱，所有發生的變化都發生在與事件相關的特征上，因為它們在系列中存在。這些特征可能是性質的，也可能是關系的。如果它們具有性質，那麽它就不能被稱為相同的，因為事件的性質會發生變化，所以事件不會總是保持不變。如果特征是關系的，那麽在實體上必然與另一實體具有內在的質量關系，但由於與事件的關系類型也會改變其感知和特征，因此不能完全相同。因此，只有一個變化發生了，那就是過去比過去離現在更遠。這說明對時間的感知始終是主觀的，因為過去只被記為發生過，而每一次的回憶，除了沒有發生任何變化的現實，只有對事件的主觀看法外，質量和關系的特征都在變化。
齊默爾曼(2005)認為，一系列被稱為理論家的人是現當代主義的極端追隨者，他們遵循過去、現在和未來之間的區別。他承認A理論家和B理論家對時間區別的感知取決於他們對時間區別的關系和態度。麥克塔格特反對這一觀點，他認為，時間與過去、現在和未來的區別是考慮到時間的度量的，如果時間有終點，但如果時間是永恒的，那麽這種區別是沒有根據的，只有特征在變化。未來無法阻止成為過去，這適用於所有生命的每一個時刻(Smart, 1964)。因此，當齊默爾曼與理論家爭論時，他很自然地反駁了試圖將時間分成三個不同部分的觀點。麥克塔格特已經表明，每一個未來都已成為過去，因此時間的運行方式一直是沒有間隔的，因此不可能衡量其巨大的永恒，這可以從將一個事件稱為過去、現在和未來的問題中看出。
反對麥克塔格特的另一個自然的論點和反對意見是，未來、現在和過去在一個時刻的連續存在，以及在時間中流逝、從“將來”變成“過去”的時刻(帕特森，1941年)。這個論點帶有緊張的成分，因為反對者自然會說，它更多的是一個接一個的時刻，這證明了在現實中存在一系列的必要性。麥克塔格特認為，未來、現在和過去的這三個時態要素不可能同時存在於一個時刻，如果提出連續存在，那麽任何事件的“現在”時刻都不存在。他認為，如果一個事件沒有“現在”時態，那麽它怎麽可能是“將來”和“過去”。這證明了一個事實，即一個事件的三個要素在同一時刻連續出現。這也可以通過一個例子來證明，當一個人深入參與一項活動時，他沒有註意到時間的流逝，突然意識到大量的時間已經過去了。為了理解和感知時間，他需要理解時間的未來，現在和過去時態，因為他完全參與了一個時間是不可感知的行為，這證明了時間是主觀的，相對的，而不是客觀的。對於一個完全投入到某一行為中的人來說，時間是不存在的，因為只有瞬間才有一個短暫的過程，而對於一個意識到瞬間變化特征的人來說，時間是在變化的。但在現實中，只有時間的關系和特征在變化。
代寫essay :反對麥克塔格特關於時間非現實性的主張
McTaggart gives a beautiful example, that considering a death of a Queen, it has some characteristics, such as ‘it is a death’, ‘it is a death of the Queen’, and ‘that it has such causes and such effect’. There is some change in the event in one respect and there is no change in another respect. The change happens when it was s future event, that the death was about to occur. Then it became a near future, then the death occurred in the present, and then it became near past and then far past. Thus, every moment for all sentient beings transmits from further future to further past and keeps on going further past into oblivion and out of memory. McTaggart then claims that all change that happened has happened in the characteristics attached to the event by their existence in the A series. Those characteristics may be of qualities or of relations. If they are of qualities, then it cannot be called as the same since qualities of the event alter, so the events will not always remain the same. If the characteristics is of relations, then on entity must have inside a quality relationship with the other, but since the type of relationship with events also change their perception and characteristics, it cannot be completely the same. Thus, only one change happens that the past is further from the present than it was before. This shows that the perception of time is always subjective as the past is only remembered as being occurred and each time is recollected, the characteristics of quality and relations change except the reality that nothing has changed and only the subjective view of the event.
Zimmerman (2005) argues that A series termed as A theorists are extreme followers of presentism and follow the distinction between past, present and future. He admits that A theorists and B theorists take the perception of distinction of time depending on their relation and attitude to the distinction. This is objected by McTaggart’s claim that the distinction of time into past, present and future is considerate for the measurement of time if time has an end, but if time is eternal then the distinction is baseless and only the characteristics change. Future cannot be stopped from becoming the past and that applies to each moment for all beings (Smart, 1964). Thus, when Zimmerman argues against A theorists, it is natural that he is arguing against the claim that has been trying to distinguish time into three different parts. McTaggart has shown that every future has become a past and so it has been the way time is running without interval, thereby making it impossible for measuring its immense eternity, indicated by the problems in calling one event as past, present, and future together.
Another natural argument and objection against McTaggart would be the successive existence of future, present, and past in a single moment and the moment passing in time and becoming ‘what was’ from ‘what will be’(Patterson, 1941). This argument has the tense element attached as the objector would naturally say that it is more of a succession of each moment this proving the necessity of A series to be existent in reality. McTaggart had a view that these three tense elements of future, present, and past cannot exist together in a moment and if successive existence is suggested, then there is no existence of the ‘present’ moment of any event. He argues that if there is no ‘present’ tense of an event then how can it be ‘future’ and ‘past’. This disproves the fact that successive presence of the three elements of an event in a single moment. This can also be disproved by an example when one is deeply involved in an activity such that he does not notice the passing time and suddenly realise that an ample amount of time has passed. For he to understand and perceive time, he needs to be understanding the future, present and past tense of time, and since he was completely involved in an act where time was imperceptible, it proves that it is subjective and relative and not objective. Time for someone who is utterly involved in an act is inexistent where only moments have a passing process, and for someone who is conscious of the characteristics of the moments changing, time is changing. But in reality, only the relations and characteristics of time are changing.
