McTaggart gives a beautiful example, that considering a death of a Queen, it has some characteristics, such as ‘it is a death’, ‘it is a death of the Queen’, and ‘that it has such causes and such effect’. There is some change in the event in one respect and there is no change in another respect. The change happens when it was s future event, that the death was about to occur. Then it became a near future, then the death occurred in the present, and then it became near past and then far past. Thus, every moment for all sentient beings transmits from further future to further past and keeps on going further past into oblivion and out of memory. McTaggart then claims that all change that happened has happened in the characteristics attached to the event by their existence in the A series. Those characteristics may be of qualities or of relations. If they are of qualities, then it cannot be called as the same since qualities of the event alter, so the events will not always remain the same. If the characteristics is of relations, then on entity must have inside a quality relationship with the other, but since the type of relationship with events also change their perception and characteristics, it cannot be completely the same. Thus, only one change happens that the past is further from the present than it was before. This shows that the perception of time is always subjective as the past is only remembered as being occurred and each time is recollected, the characteristics of quality and relations change except the reality that nothing has changed and only the subjective view of the event.
Zimmerman (2005) argues that A series termed as A theorists are extreme followers of presentism and follow the distinction between past, present and future. He admits that A theorists and B theorists take the perception of distinction of time depending on their relation and attitude to the distinction. This is objected by McTaggart’s claim that the distinction of time into past, present and future is considerate for the measurement of time if time has an end, but if time is eternal then the distinction is baseless and only the characteristics change. Future cannot be stopped from becoming the past and that applies to each moment for all beings (Smart, 1964). Thus, when Zimmerman argues against A theorists, it is natural that he is arguing against the claim that has been trying to distinguish time into three different parts. McTaggart has shown that every future has become a past and so it has been the way time is running without interval, thereby making it impossible for measuring its immense eternity, indicated by the problems in calling one event as past, present, and future together.
Another natural argument and objection against McTaggart would be the successive existence of future, present, and past in a single moment and the moment passing in time and becoming ‘what was’ from ‘what will be’(Patterson, 1941). This argument has the tense element attached as the objector would naturally say that it is more of a succession of each moment this proving the necessity of A series to be existent in reality. McTaggart had a view that these three tense elements of future, present, and past cannot exist together in a moment and if successive existence is suggested, then there is no existence of the ‘present’ moment of any event. He argues that if there is no ‘present’ tense of an event then how can it be ‘future’ and ‘past’. This disproves the fact that successive presence of the three elements of an event in a single moment. This can also be disproved by an example when one is deeply involved in an activity such that he does not notice the passing time and suddenly realise that an ample amount of time has passed. For he to understand and perceive time, he needs to be understanding the future, present and past tense of time, and since he was completely involved in an act where time was imperceptible, it proves that it is subjective and relative and not objective. Time for someone who is utterly involved in an act is inexistent where only moments have a passing process, and for someone who is conscious of the characteristics of the moments changing, time is changing. But in reality, only the relations and characteristics of time are changing.