“聚合、自愿和强制风险披露激励:证据来自UKFTSE全股票公司”,顾名思义,是一个广受好评的尝试研究,分析和评价现有的聚合趋势,自愿和强制风险披露动机由不同公司评估后再决定各自的风险信息披露政策。这项研究来自不同的背景下全股票公司在英国富时100指数和/或上市。文章的主要作者,博士Elshandidy温和的多了,是一个会计在布里斯托尔大学的讲师,英国。发表国际审查财务分析几个关键的研究论文是一个产品的建议以及来自著名的金融专家的反馈在第四届欧洲风险会议(诺丁汉大学,2010),英国会计协会会议(卡迪夫大学,2010),英格尔研究研讨会(爱丁堡,2010)和13日苏格兰博士讨论会(斯特灵大学,2009)。正如前面提出的,本文在这种背景下寻求检查,分析和评估企业风险的趋势推动影响各种聚合、自愿和强制披露风险,所有从年度报告叙述各种英国,富时100指数上市公司在非金融领域。为本研究选择的公司特征的系统性金融风险的水平,经风险调整后的回报,大小,股息收益率,股票回报可变性,董事会独立性、审计环境以及外来人比在公司的所有权。
“Aggregated, voluntary, and mandatory risk disclosure incentives: Evidence from UKFTSE all-share companies”, as the name suggests, is a critically acclaimed attempt at examining, analyzing and critiquing the existing trends in the aggregated, voluntary and mandatory risk disclosure incentives that are evaluated by various companies before deciding their respective risk disclosure policies. The context of this study is derived from various all-share companies based in the UK and/ or listed in the FTSE 100 index. The primary author of this paper, Dr. Tamer Elshandidy, is a Lecturer in Accounting at the University of Bristol, the United Kingdom. Accepted for publication by the International Review of Financial Analysis, the research paper was a product of several critical suggestions as well as feedback from eminent financial experts at the 4th European Risk Conference (Nottingham University, 2010), the British Accounting Association Conference (Cardiff University, 2010), the ICAS Research Workshop (Edinburgh, 2010) and the 13th Scottish Doctoral Colloquium (University of Stirling, 2009).As suggested earlier, the paper in this context seeks to examine, analyze and evaluate the trends driving the impact of corporate risk on various kinds of aggregated, voluntary and mandatory risk disclosures, all taken from the annual report narratives of various UK-based, FTSE 100 listed companies in the non-financial domain. The firms chosen for this study were characterized in terms of the levels of systematic financing risks; risk-adjusted returns, size, dividend-yield, stock return variability, board independence, audit environments as well as insider-outsider ratio in terms of ownership within the firm.